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Abstract
Tax authorities worldwide are implementing voluntary disclosure schemes to 
recover tax on ofshore investments. The US and UK, in particular, have imple-
mented such schemes in response to bulk acquisitions of information on ofshore 
holdings, recent examples of which are the “Paradise” and “Panama” papers. 
Schemes ofer afected investors the opportunity to make a voluntary disclosure, 
with reduced ine rates for truthful disclosure. Might such incentives, once antici-
pated by investors, simply encourage evasion in the irst place? We characterize the 
investor/tax authority game with and without a scheme, allowing for the possibil-
ity that some ofshore investment has legitimate economic motives. We show that a 
scheme increases net expected tax revenue, decreases illegal ofshore investment and 
increases onshore investment, but could either increase or decrease legal ofshore 
investment. The optimal disclosure scheme ofers maximal incentives for truthful 
disclosure by imposing the minimum allowable rate of ine.
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1 Introduction
An estimated 10% of world GDP is held in tax havens, much, though by no means 
all, of which goes unreported (Zucman 2013; Alstadsæter et al. 2018). The loss of 
tax receipts due to ofshore tax evasion by individuals in the United States (US) 
alone has been estimated at $30–40 billion per annum (Gravelle 2009). In recent 
years, data breaches have allowed tax authorities around the world to acquire infor-
mation on thousands of ofshore investments. To recover any tax owing on these 
investments, tax authorities have, in many instances, ofered afected investors a one-
of and time-limited opportunity to make a voluntary disclosure through a bespoke 
facility giving overt incentives for honesty (usually in the form of a lower ine rate). 
We term facilities of this form Incentivized Ofshore Voluntary Disclosure Schemes, 
or just “schemes”. The net revenues arising from such schemes have been signii-
cant: in 2009 a US scheme raised $3.4 billion (GAO 2013) and a UK scheme netted 
nearly £500 million (Treasury  Committee 2012). The UK scheme is estimated to 
have cost £6 million to administer (Committee of Public Accounts 2008), implying a 
return of 67:1. This compares favorably with reported yield/cost ratios in the UK of 
around 8:1 for traditional audit-based enforcement programs (HMRC 2006).1
The advent of ofshore data leakages, and the associated implementation of vol-
untary disclosure schemes, may have come as a surprise to holders of legacy invest-
ments, but such developments are by now well understood by today’s prospective 
ofshore investors. Given that such schemes are by now largely anticipated, this 
raises the question of whether the continued use of such schemes is gainful to tax 
authorities. In particular, in ofering incentives for voluntary disclosure, might such 
schemes simply encourage illegal ofshore investment in the irst place—a concern 
pointed to by some recent empirical evidence. We shed light on this concern.
In this paper, we appraise the use of anticipated ofshore disclosure schemes 
using game theoretic tools. The model has two key features. First, we consider dis-
closure schemes that are implemented retrospectively in response to an information 
leak, as we argue characterizes practice in the UK and US. By the time of the infor-
mation leak, however, the act of illegal ofshore evasion has already taken place. 
As it cannot inluence the illegal act retrospectively, the best a tax authority can do 
is seek to recover any tax owed. The importance of this observation lies in the fact 
that, in implementing incentivized schemes to recover eiciently tax owed from past 
evasion, the tax authority may inadvertently change the incentives for future acts 
of ofshore evasion. Second, we recognize that there can be legitimate economic 
reasons for holding money in ofshore accounts. Accordingly, not all investors who 
appear in data on ofshore holdings owe tax. Pritchard and Khan (2005), the only 
published work we are aware of by tax authority insiders with unfettered access to 
the UK ofshore data, reports that even among those entities lagged as the highest 
risk category in ofshore data only 70% were expected to owe tax.
1 The ratio of 8:1 is the estimated yield/cost ratio for self-assessment non-business enquiry work in 
2005–2006.
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Why invest ofshore if not to evade tax? As well as potential pecuniary bene-
its in the form of higher pre-tax rates of interest than available onshore, ofshore 
investments can also ofer legitimate tax advantages. Pension funds routinely invest 
via funds domiciled ofshore, for they enable investors from diferent countries to 
invest in the same fund and can also legally prevent instances of double taxation. 
Most major onshore hedge funds have an accompanying ofshore vehicle. For US-
based tax-exempt organizations, such vehicles provide some legitimate relief from 
taxation of unrelated business income tax. As well as legitimate tax advantages, 
ofshore investments potentially ofer a range of non-pecuniary beneits: ofshore 
providers are known to ofer greater convenience and sophistication, presumably as 
they face lighter regulatory controls as compared with their onshore counterparts 
(Helm 1997).2 Recent leakages reveal that, in early 2000s, the Queen of the UK 
held around £10 million of her private money ofshore: such investments had no tax 
motivation as the Queen is exempt from UK income and capital gains taxes. DEG, 
a development inance institution wholly owned by the German state, is known to 
have used ofshore accounts for a number of years, citing non-pecuniary factors it 
utilized for legitimate operational purposes.3 Professional poker players, and other 
individuals who must transact regularly in many diferent currencies, are also known 
to make legitimate use of ofshore bank accounts (O’Reilly 2007).
In order to appraise the impact of anticipated disclosure schemes, we irst model 
the strategic interaction between investors and the tax authority in the absence of a 
scheme.4 We then introduce a scheme into the model and compare the results. An 
investor can decide to place an exogenous lump-sum either onshore or ofshore. An 
onshore investment must be made legally, but an ofshore investment may be made 
either legally or illegally. As such, not all investments tax authorities observe in of-
shore data owe tax. If an investor invests ofshore, the investment is subsequently 
observed by the tax authority with a positive probability. In the absence of a scheme, 
if an investor’s ofshore investment is observed, the tax authority can, if it chooses, 
verify whether any tax is owed, but at a cost. Following veriication of a tax liabil-
ity, the tax authority can recover outstanding taxes and levy ines. An equilibrium 
of this game is ineicient to the extent that the tax authority struggles to achieve 
a credible threat to verify, owing to its inability to distinguish between legal and 
illegal ofshore investments. In the presence of a scheme, the tax authority chooses 
an incentivized ine rate that will apply to liabilities disclosed within the scheme, 
2 Relative to their onshore counterparts in the US, Helm argues that ofshore funds have greater lex-
ibility and less procedural delays in changing the nature, structure, or operation of their products, and 
they face fewer investment restrictions, short-term trading limitations, capital structure requirements, and 
governance provisions. For evidence on the impact of these diferences on the behavior of onshore and 
ofshore inancial institutions see Kim and Wei (2002).
3 See DEG (2015) wherein accounts held in Mauritius are disclosed on p. 57. For the operational justii-
cation see https ://www.welt-sicht en.org/artik el/32312 /deg-ohne-ofsh ore-geht-es-nicht .
4 In this paper, we focus solely on eiciency. There is, however, an equity concern when ofering incen-
tives to tax evaders. Moreover, only a subset of evaders (i.e., those that evade through an ofshore invest-
ment) beneit. See, e.g., Bordignon (1993) and Rablen (2010) for studies of the role of equity in inluenc-
ing tax evasion. There are also moral and legal concerns concerning the purchase by tax authorities of 
information on ofshore investments that was obtained by illegal means (see, e.g., Pisterer 2013).
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and investors decide whether or not to make a disclosure within the scheme. If an 
investor does make a disclosure, they can either disclose their ofshore investment to 
be illegal and pay the tax owed plus a ine at the incentivized rate, or disclose their 
investment as legal. The tax authority can choose to verify the investments of those 
investors who disclose their ofshore investment to be legal (for an illegal investment 
might be falsely disclosed as legal). Even if an investor decides not to make a dis-
closure within the scheme, the tax authority can nevertheless choose to verify their 
investment and, where appropriate, levy ines.
We ind that the introduction of a disclosure scheme induces fewer investors to 
invest ofshore illegally. Key to this inding is the idea that disclosure schemes induce 
endogenous decisions by investors that act to lower the marginal cost of enforcement 
for tax authorities. Our indings imply that the number of investors investing onshore 
increases, but so too may the number investing ofshore legally. Thus, our model 
suggests that empirical evidence pointing to increased ofshore investment following 
the introduction of a scheme may not be evidence that such schemes generate addi-
tional ofshore evasion, but instead evidence that such schemes generate additional 
legal ofshore investment. Tax authorities also beneit from schemes: expected net 
revenue increases due to the additional voluntary compliance that occurs when some 
investors switch from investing ofshore illegally to investing ofshore legally. Con-
sistent with the design of schemes in the UK, the model predicts that the optimal 
incentivized ine rate is the lowest allowable ine rate permitted in legislation.
The paper proceeds as follows: Sect. 2 gives an overview of the use and design 
of disclosure schemes in the recovery of ofshore tax evasion, and Sect. 3 casts our 
contribution in the context of the existing literature. Section 4 presents the model, 
which is developed in the absence of a scheme in Sect. 5, and in the presence of a 
scheme in Sect. 6. Section 7 gives a comparative analysis of the consequences of the 
introduction of a scheme for investment behavior, welfare, and for net tax revenue; 
and Sect. 8 concludes.
2  Ofshore disclosure schemes
Bulk leakages of ofshore holdings data have in recent decades afected investors in 
almost all major economies: Table 1 in Langenmayr (2017), which summarizes and 
updates information provided in OECD (2010), documents the use of ofshore vol-
untary disclosure schemes to address data leakages by 40 tax authorities worldwide. 
Leakages are occurring through a variety of channels. First, some tax authorities 
are aggressively exploiting legal powers that impel private inancial institutions to 
release information relating to ofshore holdings. Second, tax authorities are cooper-
ating with whistleblowers. For instance, a list of ofshore account holders of HSBC’s 
Geneva branch—seized by French police in 2009—has been the subject of investi-
gation by tax authorities worldwide, as are further lists published by the Interna-
tional Consortium of Investigative Journalists (the “Paradise” and “Panama” papers) 
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and the Center for Public Integrity (Center for Public Integrity 2013).5 Third, tax 
authorities are exploiting information arising from new legislation, such as occurred 
when the 2003 European Savings Directive (European Union 2003) came into force. 
Last, tax authorities are taking steps to improve international cooperation through 
the signing of tax information exchange agreements, with the G20 countries lead-
ing in this regard.6 The creation in 2013 of an OECD Common Reporting Standard 
(OECD 2013) and, in 2010, the adoption in the US of the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act (FATCA), are leading to continuing information lows regarding 
ofshore investments.7
Some tax authorities have opted to address data leakages through standing 
generic mechanisms for voluntary disclosure, rather than implement bespoke of-
shore disclosure schemes. According to Table 1 of Langenmayr (2017), countries 
such as Australia, Canada, Germany and Japan have utilized standing mechanisms—
but countries such as France, Israel, the UK, and the US have opted for bespoke 
schemes. In these latter set of countries, the impetus for each scheme may be traced 
to speciic data leakages. For instance, one of the very irst schemes, the 2007 Of-
shore Disclosure Facility (ODF), was implemented in the UK following legal action 
to force ive major UK banks to disclose details of the ofshore accounts held by 
their clients. The ODF ofered afected investors time-limited access to a 10% ine 
rate (the minimum allowable penalty under UK civil legislation) if they made a full 
disclosure.
In 2009 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) learned, via a whistleblower, details 
of the ofshore accounts of a number of US citizens with the Swiss bank UBS. In 
response, it launched the Ofshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP) in the 
same year and later implemented the Ofshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative in 
2011.8 The UK implemented two schemes—the New Disclosure Opportunity and 
the Liechtenstein Disclosure Facility—in response to whistleblower information 
relating to (1) 100 UK citizens with funds in Liechtenstein; and (2) all British clients 
of HSBC in Jersey (Watt et  al. 2012). Following the signing of speciic bilateral 
tax information exchange agreements, the UK implemented the 2009 Liechtenstein 
Disclosure Facility, and three further schemes aimed at its dependencies The Isle of 
Man, Jersey and Guernsey.
5 A subset of the former list is the so-called “Lagarde list”–which contains 1991 names of Greeks with 
accounts in Switzerland. It was passed to the Greek authorities in 2010 by the then French Finance Min-
ister, Christine Lagarde (Boesler 2012).
6 Within eight months of the G20 summit of April 2009 tax havens had signed more than 300 treaties 
(Johannesen and Zucman 2014). See Konrad and Stolper (2016) for a more general model of the problem 
of coordinating against tax havens.
7 For more on the economic impact of FATCA see Dharmapala (2016).
8 See Table 1 and Appendix II of GAO (2013) for a full account of the background to, and operation of, 
these two schemes.
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3  Literature review
To our knowledge, the only theoretical analysis dedicated to ofshore disclosure 
schemes is found in Langenmayr (2017). In her model, the tax authority is a irst 
mover, deciding on the incentivized ine rate before investors decide whether or not 
to evade tax. Treating the tax authority as a irst mover is appropriate to modeling 
the implementation of schemes in those countries which have chosen to handle of-
shore data acquisitions through standing generic mechanisms for voluntary disclo-
sure. To our knowledge, however, no existing analysis addresses practice in, e.g., the 
UK and US, which—as discussed previously– have implemented bespoke schemes 
in reaction to speciic data leakages.9 We address this lacuna: in our analysis the tax 
authority is assumed to move after investors have made their investment choice. This 
case is of interest as when the tax authority is endowed with the advantage associ-
ated with moving irst an optimal scheme cannot lower net revenue, but when the 
irst-mover advantage is handed to investors the desirability of such schemes is not a 
priori obvious.
Two other diferences relative to Langenmayr’s study are worthy of mention. 
First, Langenmayr inds the introduction of a scheme increases ofshore tax eva-
sion. This efect arises at the discretion of the tax authority as a consequence of 
its revenue-maximizing strategy. That is, in equilibrium, the tax authority “permits” 
an increase in evasion as the loss of revenue through voluntary compliance is more 
than recouped through additional ine payments.10 In our model, the tax authority 
takes evasion behavior as ixed, for it has already taken place when the scheme is 
conceived. In this context, these apparently perverse incentives on the part of the tax 
authority do not arise. Rather, we ind that the introduction of a scheme unambigu-
ously reduces illegal ofshore evasion, albeit legal ofshore investment could indeed 
be increased by a scheme. Second, while Langenmayr makes the important point 
that disclosure schemes may reduce the per-investor veriication cost (as the inves-
tor freely supplies the necessary information) we show that a case for such schemes 
exists even neglecting this consideration. Instead, we highlight how the design of a 
scheme reduces the number of investments that must be veriied. As a consequence, 
the marginal cost of increasing the probability of veriication falls, for this probabil-
ity applies to a smaller base of investments.
Our analysis relates to a number of other literatures. We connect to a literature 
on the use by tax authorities of pre-audit settlements in which investors can acquire 
full (e.g., Chu 1990; Glen Ueng and Yang 2001) or partial (Goerke 2015) insurance 
from audit risk. These settlements are shown to yield a Pareto improvement relative 
to random auditing as (1) the tax authority captures the positive risk premium of a 
9 In assuming the tax authority moves second, our model has similarities with, e.g., Graetz et al. (1986). 
Diferent from this analysis, however, we assume that, for the tax authority to go to the trouble of per-
forming veriication, it must be strictly gainful in expectation. This leads the tax authority to adopt a pure 
strategy, whereas Graetz et al. consider a mixed strategy for the tax authority.
10 For another context in which a revenue-maximizing tax authority does not maximize voluntary com-
pliance see Rablen (2014).
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risk-averse investor and (2) the tax authority conducts fewer random audits. Such 
audit settlement schemes, however, rely on the tax authority moving irst, before 
the investor makes the evasion choice. They are, therefore, not directly applicable 
in our framework. It is also notable that, even were we to allow the tax authority to 
move irst, such settlement procedures would not induce a Pareto improvement in 
our framework. We consider risk neutral investors, so the tax authority is not able 
to extract a positive risk premium; and we assume the tax authority audits optimally 
with and without a scheme, which rules out random auditing. In particular, in our 
model the tax authority does not gain from a reduction in the number of audits it 
performs per se, as it only ever audits when it is strictly gainful in expectation to do 
so.
As our model examines both the initial decision by the investor to evade, as well 
as the investor’s subsequent disclosure decision, it is closely associated with the lit-
erature investigating anticipated tax amnesties, by which we mean voluntary disclo-
sure schemes run in the absence of new information, which nevertheless ofer inves-
tors reduced penalties if they wish to disclose an illegal ofshore investment [see, 
e.g., Bayer et  al. (2015) and the references therein]. Empirical evidence demon-
strates clearly that there exists a signiicant body of investors who will not disclose 
under an amnesty who will disclose under a scheme, presumably because the latter 
entails the credible threat of sanctions in the event of non-disclosure. Londoño-Vélez 
and Ávila-Mahecha (2018) document how participation in a pre-existing Colom-
bian mechanism for voluntary disclosure increased more than eightfold following 
the publication of the Panama papers, while Johannesen et al. (2018) and Bethmann 
and Kvasnicka (2016) document similarly large efects on the use of standing volun-
tary disclosure mechanisms in the US and Germany, respectively, following ofshore 
data leakages. Consistent with this evidence, the investors in our model would never 
make a voluntary disclosure in the absence of new information, but do make a dis-
closure when, following the receipt of information, a scheme is ofered. Whereas the 
literature has cast doubt on the desirability to tax authorities of anticipated amnes-
ties, our analysis of voluntary disclosure schemes arrives at more positive conclu-
sions. An optimally designed scheme, even when anticipated, increases net revenue 
and reduces illegal ofshore evasion.
Our work also connects to the literature on law enforcement with self-reporting 
(e.g., Kaplow and Shavell 1994). In this literature, truthful disclosure is induced by 
allowing those who report to pay a sanction equal to the certainty equivalent of the 
expected sanctions they would otherwise face by not self-reporting. The insights of 
Kaplow and Shavell are suicient to establish that, if a tax authority moves irst, 
then a scheme can always be made unambiguously beneicial: it can be chosen, 
for instance, to lower enforcement costs while holding incentives to commit eva-
sion ixed. While our model also utilizes this insight, the key diference between our 
model and this literature is that the tax authority moves second, after the crime is 
committed. In this setting, it is unclear that the desirable properties of self-reporting 
when the law enforcer moves irst are retained.
A further related literature is that on optimal auditing in the presence of signals 
(e.g., Scotchmer 1987; Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo 2002; Bigio and Zil-
berman 2011). Under a scheme both the very act of making a disclosure and its 
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content are signals that the tax authority observes before deciding whether to verify 
(audit). Last, as the ability of tax authorities to extract revenue from whistleblower 
data inluences the degree to which they should incentivize such behavior, our ind-
ings inform the literature on the optimal incentivization of whistleblowing (Yaniv 
2001) and complement studies that analyze compliance in the presence of poten-
tial whistleblowers (Mealem et al. 2010; Bazart et al. 2014; Johannesen and Stolper 
2017).
4  Model
In this section, we model ofshore disclosure schemes as a strategic interaction 
between investors, who can invest either onshore or ofshore, and the domestic tax 
authority.
Each investor i belonging to the set T receives a lump-sum w
i
> 0 , unobserved 
by the tax authority. The lump-sum is distributed across investors according to the 
function W ∶
[
w, w
]
∈ ℝ
>0 ↦ (0, 1] . Each investor should, by law, declare the lump-
sum for taxation at the (exogenous) marginal rate 휃 ∈ (0, 1).11 We assume, however, 
that investors have three possible actions: (1) invest the lump-sum ofshore without 
declaring it for domestic taxation (illegal ofshore investment); (2) declare the lump-
sum for domestic taxation and invest the remaining amount [1 − 휃]w ofshore (legal 
ofshore investment); or (3) declare the lump-sum for domestic taxation and invest 
the remainder onshore. In considering these actions, we stress that investing money 
ofshore is not an illegal act: what makes an ofshore investment illegal in our model 
is the failure to previously declare the source capital for domestic taxation. Amounts 
invested ofshore earn a rate of return r
OFF
> 0 , and amounts invested onshore earn 
a rate of return r
ON
> 0.12 Investors consume the investment (plus earned interest), 
upon its maturity.
We shall assume, for simplicity, that interest income accruing from investment is 
untaxed. That is, we focus on the evasion of tax on the source capital rather than the 
evasion (“sheltering”) of interest income. As well as giving tractability, we note that 
the former is of greater economic signiicance: the amount of source capital is typi-
cally many times the annual interest low such that only when undeclared interest 
11 Although iscal policy is endogenous at the level of government, we treat it as exogenous to the tax 
authority. In government, responsibility for the collection of taxes is usually decoupled from the setting 
of iscal policy—the former being considered an operational matter, the latter one of policy. For instance, 
in the US, responsibility for the collection of taxes resides with an operational bureau of the Department 
of the Treasury, the IRS, whereas responsibility for iscal policy lies on the policy side of the Depart-
ment—the Oice of Tax Policy. This structure is mirrored in the UK between H.M. Treasury and its col-
lection agency, H.M. Revenue and Customs (HMRC). For a good overview of research into delegated tax 
enforcement see, e.g., Sánchez and Sobel (1993).
12 In modeling 
{
rON, rOFF
}
 as exogenous positive constants, the model is agnostic as to the relative mag-
nitude of these two quantities. Under additional assumptions regarding the separate structures of the 
onshore and ofshore industries, an arbitrage relationship might be postulated to endogeneously relate 
these two quantities. Our results are robust to, but do not require, such an approach.
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has accrued over many years does the tax liability from this source become of a 
comparable magnitude to that on the undeclared capital.13
As discussed in the introduction, ofshore investments may difer from onshore 
investments both in the pecuniary and non-pecuniary dimensions. We capture the 
former dimension through the separate rates of return, r
ON
 and r
OFF
 ; and the lat-
ter dimension, for each investor i, by a parameter b
i
> 0 , where b
i
< 1 signiies that 
the non-pecuniary beneits to i from investing ofshore exceed those from investing 
onshore, while b
i
> 1 signiies the reverse. b
i
 is independent of w
i
 , and is distributed 
across investors according to the function B ∶ ℝ
>0 ↦ (0, 1].
An ofshore investment (legal or illegal) is subsequently observed by the tax 
authority with probability p ∈ (0, 1).14 In the long run, p is endogenous to the eforts 
of tax authorities in, e.g., improving international cooperation and incentivizing 
whistleblowing. We treat p as exogenously determined, however, as in the short-run 
tax authorities must take it as ixed.
The underlying inference problem for the tax authority is as follows: if it observes 
an ofshore investment of amount y, this could be the illegal investment of an inves-
tor with lump-sum w = y or the legal investment of an investor with lump-sum 
w = y∕[1 − 휃] . While the simplicity of our model confers many advantages, one dis-
advantage is that it might lead the reader to underestimate the practical complexities 
to a tax authority of making this inference: investors afected by ofshore schemes 
are, in most cases, high net-worth individuals with often extremely complex inan-
cial arrangements, frequently involving the use of intermediary trust structures 
that make mapping investments to their “beneicial owner” a prolonged and labor-
intensive process. For this demographic, the idea that the lump-sum—even when 
declared—will appear in a transparent and separately itemized form within the tax 
return of a known individual in a known tax year is in most cases unduly optimis-
tic. Rather—as evidenced by the fact that tax authorities are routinely observed to 
seek external information from both the afected taxpayer and other inancial insti-
tutions—tax authorities are typically unable to verify the legality of an investment 
solely on the basis of their internal information. Moreover, even once a lump-sum 
has been pinpointed, its nature (e.g., bequest, income, capital gain) must be estab-
lished to verify that the correct tax was applied. Bearing these points in mind, we 
therefore suppose the tax authority must sink a veriication cost c > 0 to reveal the 
nature of an ofshore investment.15
14 We assume, for simplicity, that the tax authority acquires ofshore data at zero cost, as has often 
been the case historically. On occasions when payments have been made, the amounts involved—where 
known—appear relatively modest in relation to the revenue generated. Bradley Birkenfeld, a UBS 
employee who acted as an IRS informer, received a payment of $104 million, but in the context of some 
$3.4 billion raised by the resulting scheme (GAO 2013). HMRC is reported to have paid a former Liech-
tenstein bank employee a fee of just £100,000 for information regarding more than £100 million of of-
shore assets (Oates 2008). Clearly, however, any amount paid to acquire information must be set against 
the revenue accruing from a scheme.
15 In our analysis, the cost c applies always, irrespective of whether an investor makes a voluntary dis-
closure. In Langenmayr (2017), by contrast, veriication is assumed to cost the tax authority less if the 
investor makes a voluntary disclosure. As this alternative assumption adds to the case for disclosure 
schemes, its adoption only strengthens the case for schemes.
13 See, e.g., Pritchard and Khan (2005) for a detailed discussion and empirical evidence on this point.
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If a tax liability is veriied, the tax authority can levy a ine on the undeclared tax 
at a rate f ∈ [f , f ] , where the bounds on f are interpreted as being speciied in legis-
lation. Standard arguments (e.g., Kaplow and Shavell 1994) ensure that a revenue-
maximizing tax authority will choose f = f  . At the ine rate f  , the amount an inves-
tor must pay in tax and ines on a veriied illegal investment y is denoted by
We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 Q(f , w) > c.
Assumption 2 p[1 + f ] > 1 > p[1 + f ].
Assumption 1 may be interpreted as requiring the lump-sum w to be suiciently 
large that it is gainful for the tax authority to verify an ofshore investment known 
to be illegal. Empirically, this assumption is very likely satisied, for ofshore invest-
ments are typically large.16 Moreover, observed ofshore holdings that are too small 
to be gainfully investigated can be screened almost costlessly by the tax authority. 
Assumption 2 implies that, at the maximum ine rate, f  , it is not gainful (in expec-
tation) to invest ofshore illegally if the tax authority, conditional on observing the 
investment, will verify with certainty. If this inequality is not satisied, illegal of-
shore investment is a one-way bet, for it pays even when the tax authority’s enforce-
ment is maximal. The second inequality in Assumption 2 is that, at the minimum 
ine rate, f  , it is gainful to invest ofshore illegally even if, conditional on observing 
the investment, the tax authority will verify with certainty. If this inequality is not 
met, the tax authority’s enforcement is so strong that it can eliminate all ofshore 
investment in the presence of a scheme. Note that Assumption 2 rules out the pure 
amnesty case p = 0 in which there is no threat that an illegal ofshore investment 
will subsequently be observed.
Investors behave so as to maximize expected consumption, while the tax author-
ity behaves so as to maximize revenue (comprising voluntary compliance, recov-
ered tax, and ines) net of enforcement costs.17 While the implied risk neutrality of 
the tax authority is standard, the risk neutrality of investors might seem restrictive. 
Allowing for risk-averse investors can only strengthen the case for voluntary dis-
closure schemes, however. In the absence of a scheme, risk-averse investors would 
pay a premium to insure against the risk associated with possible tax authority 
(1)Q(f , y) = 휃[1 + f ]y.
16 According to Watt et al. (2012), the list of HSBC Jersey account holders obtained by HMRC in 2012 
identiies 4388 investors holding £699 million in ofshore current accounts, which implies an average 
holding of £159,000. The median account balance of more than 10,000 closed cases from the 2009 
OVDP in the US is reported as $570,000 in GAO (2013).
17 For simplicity, we eliminate intertemporal considerations by assuming a time preference rate of unity 
(for both investors and the tax authority). To the extent that tax authorities do care about the timing of 
tax receipts, not just their level, our results suggest that the implementation of a scheme is beneicial. 
This holds as we ind schemes to increase voluntary compliance, implying that more tax is paid at the 
time the investment is made.
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veriication. When a scheme is ofered, however, investors can avoid uncertain veri-
ication by disclosing truthfully. In this way, the tax authority is able to capture the 
investor’s risk premium within the scheme. To establish an economic case for the 
use of such schemes, therefore, it is suicient to suppose risk neutral investors.
We denote the expected consumption from choosing an investment of type k 
as C
k
 , where k = ON is for onshore investment, k = L is for legal ofshore invest-
ment, and k = I is for illegal ofshore investment. We can then partition the set 
T into those investors that invest onshore, ofshore legally, and ofshore illegally, 
T = T
ON
∪ T
OFF
= T
ON
∪ T
I
∪ T
L
 , where
Conditional on having chosen to invest ofshore, the probability that an inves-
tor who invests an amount y chooses to do so illegally is denoted 휙 = 휙(y) ∈ [0, 1] . 
When the tax authority chooses its enforcement parameters 휙(y) has already been 
chosen by investors. As, however, the tax authority does not observe 휙(y) , it must 
base its enforcement choices on its expectation of this quantity, which we denote by 
퐄(휙(y)).
5  No scheme
In order to appraise the use of disclosure schemes, we now model the “do noth-
ing” benchmark case in which the tax authority does not ofer a scheme (NS). The 
game in the absence of a scheme is set out in Fig.  1. At the outset, nature deter-
mines each investor’s lump-sum, w
i
 , and his/her level of non-pecuniary beneit, b
i
 , 
but this action is unobserved by the tax authority. Next, investors make an invest-
ment choice as described previously. Ofshore investors have their investment subse-
quently observed by the tax authority with probability p. If ofshore holdings are not 
observed by the tax authority, any illegal ofshore investment goes undetected with 
probability one, and the game ends. If ofshore holdings are observed by the tax 
authority, it will verify each ofshore investment with a probability 훼 ∈ [0, 1] , known 
to taxpayers. It follows that expected investor consumption is given by
where implicit in this formulation is that an investor holding an illegal ofshore 
investment must, in the event of veriication, repatriate some of their investment to 
meet the tax and ines payable, and does not, therefore, earn interest on this amount. 
Note from (2) and (3) that if r
ON
= r
OFF
 and b
i
= 1 then an investor is exactly 
TON = i ∶ CON ≥ max
{
CL, CI
}
; TOFF = i ∶ CON < max
{
CL, CI
}
;
TL = i ∈ TOFF ∶ CL ≥ CI; TI = i ∈ TOFF ∶ CL < CI.
(2)CON =
[
b
i
+ rON
]
[1 − 휃]w;
(3)CL =
[
1 + rOFF
]
[1 − 휃]w;
(4)CI =
[
1 + rOFF
]
[w − p훼Q(f , w)];
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indiferent between a legal ofshore investment and an onshore investment. More 
generally, the balance of pecuniary and non-pecuniary beneits favors a legal of-
shore investment when r
OFF
− r
ON
> b
i
− 1.
The expected net revenue the tax authority will generate from the members of 
T is given by:
where the irst term is the revenue generated through voluntary compliance, and the 
second term,
is the expected net revenue from verifying investors in OFF. Here Y(⋅) denotes the 
distribution function of observed ofshore investments. Importantly, as the second 
mover, the tax authority takes as pre-determined the investment decisions of the 
investors. Accordingly, choosing 훼 to maximize RT(훼;퐄(휙)) is equivalent to choos-
ing 훼 to maximize ROFF(훼;퐄(휙)) , i.e., the net revenue from verifying the investments 
of ofshore investors. Diferentiating ROFF(훼;퐄(휙)) with respect to 훼 we obtain
Hence, when observing an ofshore investment of amount y, the tax authority 
chooses
How is the tax authority’s expectation 퐄(휙) formed? Although in any one 
instance the tax authority may under- or over-predict the true value of 휙 , it seems 
appropriate to assume that, on average, the tax authority’s beliefs regarding 휙 are 
correct. We suppose, therefore, that the tax authority forms a rational expectation 
퐄(휙) = 휙 . Hence, (6) reduces to
where here we adopt the convention that, if the tax authority is indiferent between 
verifying and not-verifying, it does not verify. Equation (7) captures an important 
intuition of the model: if the propensity to invest ofshore illegally, 휙 , is suiciently 
high then the tax authority will always choose to verify ( 훼 = 1 ). If, however, 휙 , is 
suiciently low that the expected gain from veriication, 휙Q(f , y) − c , falls to (or 
below) zero, the tax authority does not ind it gainful to verify an observed of-
shore investment, hence 훼 = 0 . As shall become clear, the discreteness of the tax 
(5)RT(훼;퐄(휙)) = ∫ ∫
TON∪TL
휃w dWdB + pROFF(훼;퐄(휙)),
ROFF(훼;퐄(휙)) = ∫ ∫TOFF{퐄(휙)[훼Q(f , y) − c] − [1 − 퐄(휙)]훼c} dY dB,
휕ROFF(훼;퐄(휙))
휕훼
= ∫ ∫TOFF
[
퐄(휙)Q(f , y) − c
]
dYdB.
(6)훼(y;퐄(휙)) =
{
0 if 퐄(휙) ≤
c
Q(f ,y)
;
1 otherwise.
(7)훼(y;휙) =
{
0 if 휙 ≤
c
Q(f ,y)
;
1 otherwise;
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authority’s veriication strategy induces some risk neutral investors to commit of-
shore evasion probabilistically as part of a mixed strategy.
It follows from (7) that expected consumption, conditional on choosing to 
invest ofshore, can be written as
We depict CNS
OFF
(휙, w) as the solid line in Fig. 2. When 휙 ≤ c∕Q(f , w) the inves-
tor’s payof in (8) is strictly increasing in 휙 for, from (7), the tax authority will 
choose not to verify. Immediately above 휙 = c∕Q(f , w) the tax authority becomes 
willing to verify, causing the payof CNS
OFF
 to jump downward discretely. As a con-
sequence of Assumption 2, once the tax authority can commit to verify, it is no 
longer gainful in expectation to invest ofshore illegally. Accordingly, increases in 
휙 above c∕Q(f , w) are seen in Fig. 2 to only reduce the payof CNS
OFF
 further. Thus, 
C
NS
OFF
 is maximized with respect to 휙 where
at which point the tax authority is exactly indiferent between verifying and 
not-verifying.
Substituting (9) into (8) we obtain
(8)
CNS
OFF
(휙, w) =
{[
1 + rOFF
]
{휙w + [1 − 휙][1 − 휃]w} if 휙 ≤
c
Q(f ,w)
;[
1 + rOFF
]{
휙[w − pQ(f , w)] + [1 − 휙][1 − 휃]w
}
otherwise.
(9)휙(w) =
c
Q(f , w)
,
Fig. 1  The ofshore evasion 
game in the absence of an 
ofshore voluntary disclosure 
scheme
Investor
Nature
Nature
ϕ
T
1 – α α
1 – p p
Nature
1 – p
T
1 – αα
p
{b,w}
ON OFF
1 – ϕ
Investor
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The payof to investing ofshore in (10) is strictly preferred to the payof from invest-
ing onshore in (2) if
Proposition 1 In the absence of a scheme, if b
i
< b̃NS
(
w
i
)
 an investor i ∈ T  invests 
ofshore illegally with probability c
Q(f ,wi)
 and ofshore legally with probability 
Q(f ,wi)−c
Q(f ,wi)
; and invests onshore with probability one otherwise.
A hallmark of the equilibrium outcome is that, owing to its inability to distin-
guish between legal and illegal ofshore investments, the tax authority is only able to 
cap the propensity for illegal ofshore investment at 휙
(
wi
)
= c∕Q(f , wi) . Below this 
propensity it is unable to sustain a credible veriication threat.
6  The scheme
We now suppose the tax authority ofers a scheme in the event that ofshore invest-
ments are observed. The game is set out in Fig.  3. The initial hidden action by 
nature and the subsequent investment decision are modeled in the same way as in 
the absence of a scheme. If ofshore investments are observed, however, the tax 
authority chooses the terms of a scheme it then announces to investors.18 ,19 Inves-
tors then choose either to enter or not enter the scheme. If the investor enters s/he 
discloses a type d ∈ {L, I} . An investor disclosing d = I (illegal) accompanies their 
disclosure with a payment to the tax authority of Q(fS, y) , where fS ∈ [f , f ] is termed 
(10)CNSOFF(w) =
[
1 + r
OFF
]c + [1 − 휃][1 + f ]w
1 + f
.
b <
C
NS
OFF
(w)
[1 − �]w
− r
ON
≡ b̃
NS(w).
18 Thus an investor faces uncertainty as to whether their investment will be observed, but knows a 
scheme will be ofered if their investment is observed. The model can be generalized to allow the tax 
authority to implement a scheme with a given probability in the event that information is observed. As, 
however, this probability turns out to be exactly one in equilibrium we omit this step without loss of gen-
erality.
19 In practice a tax authority may also face a second choice as to the set of investors with whom it com-
municates the scheme. For instance, prior to the OVDP in the US, the Swiss authorities agreed to hand 
the IRS the names of approximately 4450 US clients with accounts at UBS. The IRS then had the choice 
of (1) requiring UBS to write to afected clients informing them that the details of their ofshore holding 
had been handed to the IRS; or (2) requiring UBS to write to a wider set of its clients (up to the set of all 
UBS clients with ofshore holdings) informing them that the details of their ofshore holding might have 
been handed to the IRS. In actuality, the IRS chose the second option, and—to prevent investors from 
inferring whether their information had been handed over—negotiated a conidentiality clause with the 
Swiss that concealed the criteria by which the clients were selected until after the OVDP deadline had 
passed (GAO 2013). We abstract from this issue here, but note it as a potentially interesting avenue for 
future research.
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the “incentivized” ine rate. An investor disclosing d = L (legal) makes no accom-
panying payment. The tax authority veriies the disclosure d = L with probability 
훼S ∈ [0, 1] and never veriies the disclosure d = I . Veriication reveals the nature of 
an ofshore investment with certainty: if the tax authority inds an investor to have 
disclosed falsely it levies a ine at the (maximum) rate f  . When an investor chooses 
to not enter the scheme the tax authority veriies their investment with probabil-
ity 훼O ∈ [0, 1] . If an illegal investment is veriied, the investor is ined at the rate 
fO ∈ [f , f ] . Standard arguments ensure that the tax authority will set fO = f .
Owing to the revelation principle, attention may be conined to schemes (mecha-
nisms) in which investors disclose truthfully. Consider the subgame that arises when 
an investor enters the scheme. If an investment is illegal, falsely disclosing d = L 
results in an expected payment of 훼SQ(f , y) , whereas disclosing d = I results in a sure 
payment of Q(fS, y) . Hence truthful disclosure requires that Q(fS, y) ≤ 훼SQ(f , y).
20 As, 
in equilibrium, the tax authority will never ind it optimal to set f
S
 below that required 
to achieve truthful disclosure, it follows that
If it observes the ofshore investments the tax authority chooses the parameters of 
the scheme, { 훼S, fS }, as well as the analogous parameters for investors who choose 
to not enter the scheme { 훼O, fO }, to maximize the expected net revenue raised from 
investors belonging to T
OFF
 . An investor with an illegal ofshore investment faces a 
sure payment Q(fS, w) = 훼SQ(f , w) if they enter the scheme, and an expected pay-
ment 훼OQ(f , w) if they choose to not enter. We assume that, in the case of perfect 
indiference, investors enter the scheme. Accordingly, an investor with an illegal 
ofshore investment will enter the scheme if 훼
O
≥ 훼
S
 . An investor with a legal of-
shore investment is indiferent between entering and not entering the scheme, so will 
always enter.
(11)Q(fS, y) = 훼SQ(f , y).
Fig. 2  Expected consumption as a function of 휙
20 If an ofshore investment is legal, disclosing d = I falsely results in a sure loss of Q(fS, y) , whereas 
disclosing d = L results in no loss. Hence, truthful disclosure by investors in T
L
 is assured in equilibrium.
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To emphasize a key intuition of the model, we focus on the (equilibrium) case 
in which investors choose to enter the scheme ( 훼
O
≥ 훼
S
 ). Using the equality in (11) 
expected net revenue generated within the scheme is
Focusing on the second term in the integral in (12), which is the cost of veri-
ication, note that the veriication probability 훼
S
 applies only to the expected pro-
portion 1 − 퐄(휙) of ofshore investors who have chosen to invest ofshore legally, 
and therefore disclose d = L (the remaining proportion 퐄(휙) of ofshore investors 
who invest illegally disclose d = I truthfully). Conversely, in the absence of a 
scheme, the veriication probability 훼 applies to all ofshore investors. Expected 
veriication costs therefore fall by a factor [1 − 퐄(휙)] as fewer investments need 
to be veriied. A consequence of this observation is that the expected marginal 
cost of increasing the veriication probability also falls by a factor [1 − 퐄(휙)] 
under a scheme. This, as we shall see, extends the set of values of 휙 for which 
the tax authority is able to maintain a credible veriication threat in the presence 
of a scheme.
Establishing the equilibrium of the game in the presence of a scheme pro-
ceeds through the same set of steps as performed in Sect. 5. Matters are compli-
cated only marginally by the existence of two distinct veriication probabilities 
{ 훼O, 훼S } that are chosen by the tax authority simultaneously. In equilibrium, tax-
payers again invest so as to make the tax authority indiferent between verifying 
(12)∫ ∫TOFF{퐄(휙)훼SQ(f , y) − [1 − 퐄(휙)]훼Sc} dYdB.
Investor
Nature Nature
Nature
ϕ 1 – ϕ
T
1 – p p
1 – γ γ
1 – αO αO
T
{fS, f , αS, α }
T
αS1 – αS
d = I d = L
1 – p
T
p
{fS, f , αS, α }
T
αS 1 – αS
T
1 – αOαO
1 – γγ
d = L d = I
{b,w}
ON
OFF
Investor
Investor Investor
Fig. 3  The ofshore evasion game in the presence of an ofshore voluntary disclosure scheme
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and not-verifying, but—in light of the discussion above—this now occurs at a 
diferent threshold given by
The threshold value of value b, b̃S(w) , at which an investor is indiferent 
between investing onshore and ofshore is then found as
Relegating the proof to the Appendix, we arrive at the following:
Proposition 2 In the presence of a scheme, if b
i
< b̃S
(
w
i
)
 an investor i ∈ T  invests 
ofshore illegally with probability c
c+Q(f ,wi)
 , and ofshore legally with probability 
Q(f ,wi)
c+Q(f ,wi)
; and invests onshore with probability one otherwise.
7  Analysis
7.1  Veriication
A result that underlies all of the remaining indings we shall present is that the 
introduction of a scheme enhances the ability of the tax authority to sustain a 
credible threat to verify, leading to a lower threshold value of 휙 at which the tax 
authority becomes indiferent between verifying and not-verifying:
Proposition 3 �S(w) < �NS(w).
The underlying intuition for Proposition  3 is that, as noted previously, a 
scheme lowers the marginal cost of raising the veriication probability. In par-
ticular, an increase in 휙 applies only to ofshore investors who disclose d = L , 
whereas it applies to all ofshore investors in the absence of a scheme. To ensure 
that veriication is not gainful in expectation for the tax authority, investors 
therefore become obliged to invest ofshore illegally with a lower probability.
7.2  Investment and evasion: onshore and ofshore
By comparing the respective equilibria in the absence (Proposition 1) and presence 
(Proposition 2) of a scheme, we now analyze the consequences of introducing a 
scheme for both onshore and ofshore investment volumes, and for the decomposi-
tion of ofshore investments between those that are legal, and those that are illegal.
(13)휙
S(w) =
c
c + Q(f , w)
.
(14)b̃S(w) =
C
S
OFF
(w)
[1 − �]w
− r
ON
.
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Let us denote the expected proportion of investors choosing an investment type 
m ∈ {ON, L, I} as ||T
k
m
|
| , where k ∈ {NS, S} . Similarly, let ||m
k|
| denote the expected 
aggregate level of investment type m.
Proposition 4 
(1) ||
|
T
S
OFF
|
|
|
<
|
|
|
T
NS
OFF
|
|
|
 and ||
|
T
S
ON
|
|
|
>
|
|
|
T
NS
ON
|
|
|
;
(2) ||
|
T
S
I
|
|
|
<
|
|
|
T
NS
I
|
|
|
 but ||
|
T
S
L
|
|
|
≷
|
|
|
T
NS
L
|
|
|
;
(3) ||
|
OFF
S|
|
|
<
|
|
|
OFF
NS|
|
|
 and ||
|
ON
S|
|
|
>
|
|
|
ON
NS|
|
|
;
(4) ||
|
OFF
S
I
|
|
|
<
|
|
|
OFF
NS
I
|
|
|
 but ||
|
OFF
S
L
|
|
|
≷
|
|
|
OFF
NS
L
|
|
|
.
Parts (1) and (2) of Proposition 4 focus on the proportion of investors who invest 
ofshore with and without a scheme. The proof of part (1) demonstrates that the 
enhanced veriication threat present under a scheme causes a fall in the critical level 
of relative non-pecuniary beneits required to induce investors to invest onshore, 
i.e., b̃S(w) < b̃NS(w) . This implies that the introduction of a scheme induces a set 
of investors—those with characteristics belonging to the shaded set in Fig.  4—to 
switch from investing ofshore to investing onshore.21
According to part (2), the introduction of a scheme also unambiguously reduces 
the proportion of investors who invest ofshore illegally. As, however, both T
OFF
 
and T
I
 shrink, the proportion of investors who invest ofshore legally could either 
increase or decrease. In particular, if T
I
 shrinks proportionately more than does T
OFF
 , 
then T
L
 expands. Parts (3) and (4) of Proposition 4 show that analogous results to 
those in parts (1) and (2) hold also for aggregate investment. In part (3) the introduc-
tion of a scheme causes aggregate investment to fall—simply because some investors 
switch from investing w ofshore illegally, to instead investing the reduced amount 
[1 − 휃]w onshore legally. The fall of total investment, coupled with an increase in 
onshore investment, implies that the ofshore component of investment must fall. 
While the illegal component of ofshore investment falls, the legal component may 
increase or decrease.
The possibility that the legal component of ofshore investment could be observed 
to increase following the introduction of a scheme is consistent with the evidence 
of Langenmayr (2017), who observes an increase in oicially recorded ofshore 
investments by US citizens following the introduction of the 2009 OVDP. Within 
Langenmayr’s framework—which does not allow for legal ofshore investment—an 
increase in ofshore investment can only be interpreted as an increase in illegal of-
shore evasion. Our model, which allows for legal ofshore investment for legitimate 
economic purposes, ofers an alternative interpretation of this inding.
21 The restriction that the density function B takes strictly positive values for w > 0 ensures that there 
will always exist a positive mass of investors belonging to the shaded space indicated in Fig. 4.
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To gauge the size of the efects in Proposition 4 for realistic parameter values, 
we calibrate the model for the UK.22 Wealth is assumed to be lognormally distrib-
uted: log w ∼ N(휇, 휎) . The parameters {휇, 휎} are estimated from the UK Wealth and 
Assets Survey as 휇 = 8.90 , and 휎 = 1.91 . Non-pecuniary beneits are distributed 
according to the uniform ratio distribution, b = X
1
∕X
2
 , where 
{
X1, X2
}
 are inde-
pendent random variates with X1 ∼ U(0, 2) and X2 ∼ U(0, 2) . Given the param-
eters of the wealth distribution, we use the average account balance of UK ofshore 
investors in HSBC Jersey reported in Watt et al. (2012), i.e., £337,000, to estimate 
w = £85,655 . Combining this igure with the yield/cost ratio reported in footnote 
1, we obtain c = Q(1,337,000)∕8 = £33,700 . The remaining parameters are set as 
휃 = 0.4 , r
OFF
= r
ON
= 0.05 , and f = 1.
For this calibration, we ind that the introduction of a scheme is associated with a 
3.3% increase in the proportion of investors choosing onshore, and a 5.8% increase 
in the proportion of investors choosing to invest ofshore legally. The proportion of 
investors choosing to invest ofshore illegally falls by 26.5% (and the actual amount 
invested falls by 21.4%).
7.3  Tax revenue
Does the introduction of a scheme increase the expected net revenue of the tax 
authority?
Proposition 5 The expected net revenue collected by the tax authority from the set 
of investors T is increased by the introduction of a scheme: RS
T
> R
NS
T
.
The intuition for Proposition 5 is that the increased propensity to invest legally 
raises the level of voluntary compliance. The increase in expected revenue from vol-
untary compliance is not ofset by lower net revenues arising on amounts disclosed 
within the scheme (on account of the lower incentivized ine rate being applied). 
This occurs as the irst-mover advantage enjoyed by investors permits them to make 
choices that leave the tax authority just indiferent between verifying and not-verify-
ing. Hence, the expected revenue generated by veriication activity is exactly ofset 
by its cost.
Were we to have assumed that the tax authority could choose the scheme param-
eters before investors make their investment choice, the inding that net revenue 
increases under a scheme would be unsurprising. As, however, we take the tax 
authority to move second, the implications for net revenue were initially uncertain. It 
is notable, therefore, that even when moving second, voluntary disclosure schemes 
still increase net revenue.23
22 Similar estimates to those for the UK are obtained for the US when using wealth data from the Survey 
of Income and Program Participation of the US Census Bureau (Wealth and Asset Ownership section).
23 Whereas we consider a tax authority unfettered in its choice of ine rate from the interval [f , f ] , in 
many cases it is only in prescribed circumstances that a tax authority can levy the highest allowable ine 
rate. In the UK, for instance, the ine rate that applies is conditional upon the “behavioral” nature of the 
non-compliance: the lower bound applies if the non-compliance is judged to be through “careless error”, 
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7.4  Investor welfare
We now examine the impact of a scheme for expected investor consumption (utility):
Proposition 6 For investors belonging to
(1) TNS
ON
∩ T
S
ON
 , CNS = CS;
(2) TNS
OFF
∩ T
S
OFF
 , CNS > CS;
(3) TNS
OFF
∩ T
S
ON
 , CNS > CS.
Part (1) of Proposition 6 is for investors who invest onshore irrespective of the 
provision of a scheme: such investors are wholly unafected. Part (2) states that 
investors who invest ofshore irrespective of the provision of a scheme lose con-
sumption in the presence of a scheme. This loss arises as the probability 휙S that an 
ofshore investor chooses to invest illegally is lower in the presence of a scheme. 
Thus, the investor loses expected consumption on account of paying tax on the 
Fig. 4  The critical values b̃NS(w) and b̃S(w) at which an investor is indiferent between investing onshore 
or ofshore
Footnote 23 (continued)
whereas the upper bound applies to “deliberate and concealed” inaccuracies (HMRC 2012). A further 
potential beneit of schemes, therefore, is that they may provide the legal grounds to apply a higher rate 
of ine in cases where an investor either fails to respond to a disclosure opportunity, or makes a false dis-
closure within the scheme.
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lump-sum with a greater probability. Part (3) is for investors for whom the introduc-
tion of a scheme induces a switch from investing ofshore to investing onshore. Such 
investors move from the higher payof CNS
OFF
 in the absence of a scheme to the lower 
payof C
ON
 in the presence of a scheme (continuing to invest ofshore would yield 
the still lower payof CS
OFF
< C
ON
 ). That those investing ofshore illegally lose util-
ity appears desirable—after all, it is a consequence of a reduction in incentives for 
breaking tax law. More generally, were we to model explicitly the beneits from tax-
ation in the form of the public services it pays for, the increased tax revenue gener-
ated by schemes would generate utility for all investors through increased provision.
7.5  Optimal incentivized ine rate
For tax authorities seeking to understand the optimal design of disclosure schemes, 
it is of interest to highlight a feature of the optimal scheme relating to the question 
of how to set the incentivized ine rate for those that enter the scheme. We have the 
following result:
Proposition 7 In the optimal scheme, it holds that f
S
= f .
According to Proposition  7, the incentivized ine rate is the lowest ine rate 
allowed under legislation. This is consistent with the design of disclosure schemes 
in the UK, which have ofered those who disclose the minimum 10% penalty permit-
ted in law. The Netherlands, for which f = 0 , implemented schemes in 2009 and 
2013 on a no-ine basis. The result in Proposition 7 may initially seem surprising as 
choosing a lower ine rate reduces ine revenue. Although ine revenue indeed falls, 
net revenue is left unchanged. Lowering the incentivized ine rate makes truthful 
disclosure more attractive to investors, allowing the tax authority to achieve truth-
ful disclosure with less veriication. The reduction in veriication costs achieved 
in this way exactly ofsets the loss in ine revenue (as the tax authority is indifer-
ent between verifying and not-verifying). Accordingly, the same level of net rev-
enue is achieved with least veriication activity by setting the incentivized ine rate 
minimally.24
8  Conclusion
Tax authorities around the world are using incentivized voluntary disclosure 
schemes to recover tax on ofshore investments. Such schemes ofer discounted ine 
rates for those who voluntarily disclose (albeit in the shadow of subsequent enforce-
ment against those who do not). International initiatives such as the OECD Com-
mon Reporting Standard are expected to result in their continued use. As, however, 
24 A further factor that might account for the use of the minimum ine rate, albeit one that lies outside of 
our model, is the salience to investors of a low headline incentivized ine rate. For nascent studies of sali-
ence in the tax context see, e.g., Krishna and Slemrod (2003) and Chetty et al. (2009).
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the use of such schemes by tax authorities in response to data leakages is by now 
anticipated, the stellar returns observed for the earliest such schemes should not be 
expected to continue. As our model highlights, rational investors who anticipate 
being ofered a scheme behave so as to make the tax authority indiferent between 
verifying ofshore investments and not. In this paper, we examined whether indeed 
such anticipated schemes continue to be of value to tax authorities, or could actually 
be incentivizing ofshore evasion in the irst place.
We ind that tax authorities can increase expected net revenue by implementing 
a disclosure scheme, rather than their regular veriication regime. A hallmark of the 
optimal disclosure scheme is that it ofers the minimum allowable ine rate in law to 
those that disclose truthfully. The particular beneit the implementation of a scheme 
afords tax authorities in our model is a reduction in the base of investments that 
require costly veriication. This lowers the marginal cost of veriication, permitting 
the tax authority a stronger threat to enforce tax law. Although the implementation 
of disclosure schemes is consistent with a rise in legal ofshore investment, impor-
tantly our model predicts that the illegal component of ofshore investment always 
falls. Thus, in a sense our model helps makes precise, it is possible to ofer ex-post 
inducements for truthful disclosure without simply incentivizing the underlying 
criminal activity.
We ofer the following suggestions for future research. First, one could extend 
the model to allow for the possible sheltering of interest in ofshore accounts, along-
side the possibility of tax evasion on the source capital. Second, imperfect veriica-
tion technology might be allowed for, as in Rablen (2014). Third, communication 
between afected investors through a network, as in Hashimzade et al. (2014), might 
be introduced. Last, Johannesen et  al. (2018) ind that many US investors did not 
make use of the 2009 OVDP scheme but chose to make “quiet” disclosures through 
standing voluntary disclosure mechanisms following the leak of ofshore data. The 
model could be extended to allow for this possibility as one of the investors’ choices. 
While each of these avenues must await a dedicated treatment, we hope to have 
shed some further light on the economic efects and optimal design of disclosure 
schemes.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 The proof follows immediately from the arguments set out in 
the text.   ◻
Proof of  Proposition 2 As discussed in the text, an investor with a legal ofshore 
investment is indiferent between entering and not entering the scheme, so will enter. 
Given this, any investor who does not enter can be inferred to have invested illegally. 
Hence, by Assumption 1, 훼
O
= 1 . As 훼
O
 is maximal, it must be that 훼
O
≥ 훼
S
 , so, by 
the arguments in the text, illegal ofshore investors will enter the scheme also. We 
may therefore write ROFF
(
훼S, 훼O, y;휙
)
 as
Diferentiating ROFF
(
훼S, y;휙
)
 w.r.t. 훼
S
 we obtain that
If 휙 is suiciently low, i.e., 휙 ≤ c∕[c + Q(f , y)] then 휕ROFF
(
훼S, y;휙
)
∕휕훼S ≤ 0 , so 
the tax authority does not ind it gainful to verify disclosures d = L . It follows that, in 
this case, ROFF
(
훼S, y;휙
)
 obtains a maximum at the lowest value of 훼
S
 consistent with 
the truthtelling restriction Q(fS, y) = 훼SQ(f , y) . Hence 훼S = 훼S = [1 + f ]∕[1 + f ] . If 
� > c∕[c + Q(f , y)] then veriication is strictly gainful, so ROFF
(
훼S, y;휙
)
 achieves a 
maximum at 훼
S
= 1 . Hence
With the nature of enforcement now determined, we analyze the investor’s invest-
ment decision. Expected consumption, conditional upon investing ofshore illegally 
with probability 휙 ∈ [0, 1] , can be written using (15) as
Note that (17) uses the fact that, from (11), f
S
= f  when � > c∕[c + Q(f , w)] , 
and f
S
= f  when 휙 ≤ c∕[c + Q(f , w)] . The shape of CS
OFF
(휙, w) as a function of 휙 
is shown as the dashed line in Fig. 2. For 휙 ≤ c∕[c + Q(f , w)] the investor’s payof 
ROFF
(
훼S, y;휙
)
= ∫ ∫TOFF{휙훼SQ(f , y) − [1 − 휙]훼Sc} dYdB.
휕ROFF
(
훼S, y;휙
)
휕훼S
= ∫ ∫TOFF{휙Q(f , y) − [1 − 휙]c} dYdB.
(15)훼O(y;휙) =1;
(16)훼S(y;휙) =
{
훼
S
if 휙 ≤
c
c+Q(f ,y)
;
1 otherwise.
(17)
CS
OFF
(휙, w) =
{[
1 + rOFF
]
{휙[w − pQ(f , w)] + [1 − 휙][1 − 휃]w} if 휙 ≤
c
c+Q(f ,w)
;[
1 + rOFF
]
{휙[w − pQ(f , w)] + [1 − 휙][1 − 휃]w} otherwise.
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is strictly increasing in 휙 , by Assumption 2, as the tax authority will perform veri-
ication only with the ixed minimum probability 훼
S
 . At 휙 = c∕[c + Q(f , w)] the 
investor’s payof initially falls discreetly, and becomes strictly decreasing in 휙 
thereafter (by Assumption  2). It follows that CS
OFF
(휙) obtains a maximum in 휙 at 
휙(w) = c∕[c + Q(f , w)] . Substituting this expression for 휙 into (17), equilibrium 
consumption when investing ofshore is
The payof CS
OFF
(w) in (18) to investing ofshore is strictly preferred to the payof 
from investing onshore in (2) if b < b̃S(w) , where b̃S(w) is given in (14). The Propo-
sition follows.  ◻
Proof of Proposition 3 We have
  ◻
Proof of Proposition 4 The expected proportion of investors with lump-sum w who 
invest ofshore legally, 휏
L
(w) , and illegally, 휏
I
(w) , are given, respectively, by
where k ∈ {NS, S} , and 휙k is the value of 휙 in state k. Hence, in aggregate, the 
expected proportions of investors choosing each investment type are given by
Expected aggregate net onshore and ofshore investment are given by
where the latter may be further decomposed into its legal and illegal components:
Next, we establish that b̃S(w) < b̃NS(w):
(18)C
S
OFF
(w) =
[1 + rOFF]w
c + Q(f , w)
{c + [1 − 휃]Q(f , w)}.
�S(w) =
c
c + Q(f , w)
<
c
Q(f , w)
= �NS(w).
�k
L
(w) =
[
1 − �k
]
B(b̃k(w)); �k
I
(w) = �kB(b̃k(w));
|
|
|
T
k
ON
|
|
|
= ∫ [1 − 휏k
L
(w) − 휏k
I
(w)] dW;
|
|
|
T
k
OFF
|
|
|
= ∫ [휏k
L
(w) + 휏k
I
(w)] dW;
|
|
|
T
k
L
|
|
|
= ∫ 휏k
L
(w) dW;
|
|
|
T
k
I
|
|
|
= ∫ 휏k
I
(w) dW.
|
|
|
ON
k|
|
|
= [1 − �]∫ w[1 − B(b̃k(w))] dW;
|
|
|
OFF
k|
|
|
= ∫ w{1 − �[1 − �k(w)]}B(b̃k(w)) dW;
|
|
|
OFF
k
I
|
|
|
= ∫ w�k(w)B(b̃k(w)) dW;
|
|
|
OFF
k
L
|
|
|
= [1 − �]∫ w[1 − �k(w)]B(b̃k(w)) dW.
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We may now prove  the Proposition: (1) ||
|
T
S
OFF
|
|
|
= ∫ B(b̃S(w)) dW 
< ∫ B(b̃NS(w)) dW = ||
|
T
NS
OFF
|
|
|
 and ||
|
T
S
ON
|
|
|
= 1 −
|
|
|
T
S
OFF
|
|
|
> 1 −
|
|
|
T
NS
OFF
|
|
|
=
|
|
|
T
S
ON
|
|
|
; (2) 
|
|
|
T
S
I
|
|
|
= ∫ �SB(b̃S(w)) dW < ∫ �NSB(b̃NS(w)) dW = ||
|
T
NS
I
|
|
|
 but ||
|
T
S
L
|
|
|
=
∫ [1 − �S]B(b̃S(w)) dW ≷ ∫ [1 − �NS]B(b̃NS(w)) dW = ||
|
T
NS
I
|
|
|
; (3) ||
|
OFF
S|
|
|
= ∫ w{1−
�[1 − �S(w)]}B(b̃S(w)) < ∫ w{1 − �[1 − �NS(w)]}B(b̃NS(w)) dW = ||
|
OFF
NS|
|
|
 and 
|
|
|
ON
S|
|
|
= [1 − �] ∫ w[1 − B(b̃S(w))] dW > [1 − �] ∫ w[1 − B(b̃NS(w))]dW = ||
|
ON
NS|
|
|
; 
(4) ||
|
OFF
S
I
|
|
|
= ∫ w�S(w)B(b̃S(w)) dW < ∫ w�NS(w)B(b̃NS(w)) dW = ||
|
OFF
NS
I
|
|
|
 but 
|
|
|
OFF
S
L
|
|
|
= [1 − �] ∫ w[1 − �S(w)]B(b̃S(w))] dW ≷ [1 − �]∫ w[1 − �NS(w)]B(b̃NS(w))] dW 
=
|
|
|
OFF
NS
L
|
|
|
 .   ◻
Proof of  Proposition 5 As the choices of investors in T
OFF
 make the tax authority 
indiferent between verifying and not-verifying (both with and without a scheme), it 
is straightforward to show that, in equilibrium, RS
OFF
(y) = RNS
OFF
(y) = 0 . Hence, using 
(5), we have
where k ∈ {NS, S} . The result then follows from the inequalities in Proposition 3.  
 ◻
Proof of  Proposition 6 (1) Immediate from (2); (2) In equilibrium 
C
L
= C
I
−
[
1 + r
OFF
]
휃w . Hence C
OFF
(
휙k
)
= 휙kC
I
+ [1 − 휙k]{C
I
−
[
1 + r
OFF
]
휃w}
= C
I
− [1 − 휙k]
[
1 + r
OFF
]
휃w . It follows that C
OFF
(
�S
)
< C
OFF
(
�NS
)
⇔ �S < �NS , 
where the right-side holds by Proposition 3; (3) As C
ON
 is unafected by a scheme, 
investors who invest ofshore in the absence of a scheme but switch to investing 
onshore in the presence of a scheme must switch to a lower payof.   ◻
Proof of Proposition 7 Using the relationship Q(fS, y) = 훼SQ(f , y) in (11), and substi-
tuting 훼
S
= 훼
S
 from (15), the result obtains.   ◻
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